A False Start in Constitutionalizing Lawyer Loyalty in  Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada by Salyzyn, Amy
The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 76 (2016) Article 8
A False Start in Constitutionalizing Lawyer Loyalty
in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law
Societies of Canada
Amy Salyzyn
Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
Part of the Law Commons
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Salyzyn, Amy. "A False Start in Constitutionalizing Lawyer Loyalty in Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of
Canada." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 76. (2016).
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol76/iss1/8
A False Start in Constitutionalizing 
Lawyer Loyalty in Canada  
(Attorney General) v. Federation  
of Law Societies of Canada 
Amy Salyzyn 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada surprised many 
legal observers by choosing to recognize a new principle of fundamental 
justice pursuant to section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms:1 a lawyer’s duty of commitment to a client’s cause.2 In this 
article, I critique the majority’s choice to recognize this new principle of 
fundamental justice after first reviewing the Court’s reasons and their 
background. 
At issue in this case was the constitutionality of the federal 
government’s statutory regime for preventing and investigating money 
laundering and terrorist financing to the extent that the regime applied to 
lawyers. Broadly speaking, the provisions at issue involved: (1) client 
identification and record-keeping obligations; and (2) authorization for 
warrantless searches of lawyers’ offices. The Court found that these 
provisions breached both sections 7 and 8 of the Charter in a manner not 
justifiable under section 1. 
                                                                                                                       
  Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. An earlier draft of this article was presented at the 
19th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School on April 8, 2016. The 
author thanks the attendees of this conference for their helpful feedback as well as Adam Dodek, 
Carissima Mathen and Vanessa MacDonnell for their insightful comments and suggestions. 
1  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 7, 
2015 SCC 7 (S.C.C.), varg [2013] B.C.J. No. 632 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Federation of Law 
Societies”]. 
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The decision was a significant victory for the Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada, which had been resisting the government’s attempts 
to regulate lawyers in this area for roughly 15 years. Not only did the 
Court find the government’s legislation unconstitutional, the majority 
cited with approval the Federation’s leadership in developing its own 
model rules on money laundering and terrorist financing which have 
been adopted by all Canadian law societies. 
Notwithstanding any victory claimed by the Federation, an awkward 
precedent was created in this case through the Court’s recognition of 
client commitment as a principle of fundamental justice. To be sure, a 
duty of commitment to a client’s cause or, stated in its more familiar 
form, a duty of zealous advocacy, is well-recognized in legal ethics 
scholarship and in the Court’s jurisprudence on lawyer conflicts of 
interest. The problem, however, is that such a duty is internally limited 
by what the law demands otherwise; to the extent that lawyers must be 
committed to clients they must do so within the limits of the law. This 
qualification is essential and uncontroversial. No one disputes, for 
example, that a lawyer cannot knowingly assist a client in committing a 
criminal act or that a lawyer cannot suppress evidence contrary to 
applicable disclosure laws when representing a client in litigation. These 
examples reflect the fact that the lawyer’s partisan role vis-à-vis a client 
is informed by and, indeed, limited by, other legal constraints.  
The consequence of this reality is that elevating a duty of client 
commitment to a principle of fundamental justice results in a muddled 
analytical framework under section 7: the constitutionality of a law is 
attempted to be evaluated by a principle that itself recognizes legality as 
a legitimate boundary. Stated otherwise, the fact that lawyers’ zealous 
advocacy ends where other legal constraints begin make it illogical to 
then try to use zealous advocacy to assess the legitimacy of these other 
legal constraints. There is no foothold in the concept of zealous advocacy 
itself from which to adjudge other laws, as the concept takes such laws to 
trump its requirements and permissions, merely due to their existence.  
As explored in more detail below, the majority’s efforts to refine the 
duty of commitment by referring to less restrictive law society regulation 
in this area and to risks relating to the disclosure of solicitor-client 
information do not provide a satisfactory solution to this problem. I further 
argue that another layer of confusion is added by the use of subjective 
client perceptions about the effect of state regulation on a lawyer-client 
relationship as a basis, in and of itself, for finding an unconstitutional 
interference with a lawyer’s duty of commitment to a client’s cause. 
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Drawing from the work of Alice Woolley on independence of the bar 
as a constitutional principle, I argue that a better route to capturing what is 
at stake when the government intrudes on the lawyer-client relationship is 
to use independence of the bar as the applicable principle of fundamental 
justice and to understand independence of the bar to only justify those 
government intrusions on the lawyer-client relationship that are directed 
to protecting or promoting the integrity of the legal system and the 
lawyer’s role in providing clients appropriate access to the legal system. 
To the extent that the government wishes to regulate lawyers in order to 
pursue other policy ends (and the regulation engages the lawyer’s life, 
liberty or security), the regulation should be viewed as a violation of 
section 7 and the legitimacy of the government’s pursuit of these other 
ends, should, in my view, be considered under section 1. 
II. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
As Justice Cromwell observed in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in this case, “[t]he legislative scheme out of which this appeal 
arises is complex and a good grasp of how its provisions affect lawyers 
and clients is necessary in order to understand the issues on appeal.”3  
In view of this reality, this section outlines the relevant details of the 
statutory provisions at issue and the procedural context. 
At issue were particular provisions of the Proceeds of Crime (Money 
Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (the “Act”) and associated 
regulations (the “Regulations”) that sought to: (1) impose new client 
identification and record-keeping obligations on lawyers; and (2) provide 
new powers to conduct warrantless searches and seizures of lawyers’ 
offices (collectively, hereinafter, “the Regime”).4  
Although lawyers were the focus of this proceeding, the measures 
instituted by the Regime also apply more broadly to other financial 
intermediaries such as casinos, life insurance companies, securities 
dealers, real estate brokers and accounting firms.5 Moreover, the Regime 
creates many other powers and obligations in addition to the two 
                                                                                                                       
3  Id., at para. 10. 
4  Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17, 
ss. 2 “legal counsel”, 3, Part 1, ss. 5(i)-(j), 6-7, 9-9.1, 9.6, 10.1-11, 62-65, 65.1, 74 [hereinafter 
“Act”] and Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations, SOR/2002-
184, ss. 1(2) “funds”, “receipt of funds record”, 11.1, 33.3-33.5, 59.4, 64-67, 68-70 [hereinafter 
“Regulation”]. 
5  See, for example, Act, id., at s. 5 and Regulation, id., at s. 11.2-52. 
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mentioned above, including requiring the reporting of cross-border 
movement of currency and other monetary instruments.6 The Act also 
creates an agency — the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis 
Centre of Canada (“FINTRAC”) — to ensure compliance with the Act 
and to collect reported information.7 
1.  Client Identification and Record-Keeping Provisions 
The client identification and record-keeping provisions at issue 
required lawyers and law firms who receive or pay funds on behalf of  
a client (other than professional fees, disbursements, expenses or bail) to 
verify the identity of the client.8 In circumstances in which funds of 
$3,000 or more are received, the Regime also required lawyers to:  
(1) Keep a “receipt of funds record” (unless the amount is received from 
a financial entity or a public body) which must include the name of 
the person or entity from whom the funds were received (unless 
already apparent in other records required under regime); the date of 
the transaction; details about “any account that is affected by the 
transaction”; the purpose and details of the transaction; the amount 
and currency of the funds received; and where the funds are received 
in cash, how the cash was received (i.e., “by armoured car, in person, 
by mail or in any other way”).9  
(2) Take additional steps to confirm the identity or existence of the 
client. For example, in the case of a corporation, the lawyer must 
confirm the corporation’s existence and take reasonable measures to 
accurately ascertain the names of all directors of the corporation and 
the names and addresses of all persons who own or control, directly 
or indirectly, 25 per cent or more of the shares of the corporation  
by referring to its certificate of corporate status. The identity of 
individuals can be confirmed by referring to government issued 
identification like a birth certificate, driver’s licence or passport.10 
Where a lawyer receives funds from the trust account of another 
lawyer, the Regulations waive the requirement to confirm the identity or 
                                                                                                                       
6  See, for example, Act, id., at s. 12. 
7  See id., at ss. 40-72. 
8  Act, id., at s. 6.1, Regulation, supra, note 4, at s. 33.3. 
9  Regulation, id., at ss. 1(2) “receipt of funds record,” 33.4. 
10  Id., at ss. 11.1, 59.4 and 64-67. 
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existence of the source of the funds and the lawyer is only required  
to prepare a partial “receipt of funds record”.11 A failure to meet the 
above obligations can expose a lawyer to a fine of up to $500,000 or 
imprisonment for up to five years.12 
2.  Search and Seizure Provisions 
The search and seizure provisions allow FINTRAC (the administrative 
agency created by the Act) to enter a law office, “at any reasonable time”, 
to examine records kept in relation to the Regime and to reproduce any 
record.13 The provisions specifically authorize the search of “any computer 
system or data processing system” and also allow authorities to use 
photocopying equipment on the premises for their purposes.14 The Act 
provides that this search and seizure may be warrantless, unless the 
premises to be searched is a dwelling-house.15 As a result, a warrant would 
be required for a search of a lawyer’s home office. 
The Act provides some protection for privileged documents. 
Specifically, a lawyer is permitted to claim solicitor-client privilege in 
respect of documents that a FINTRAC representative “is about to 
examine or copy” during a search.16 If privilege is claimed, the lawyer is 
required to place the document under seal and retain it until a judicial 
hearing can be held.17 The hearing must be requested by the client or the 
lawyer within 14 days of the search (and take place within 21 days).18 
The Act also requires a FINTRAC representative conducting a search of 
a lawyer’s office to refrain from examining or making copies of any 
document without providing “reasonable opportunity” for a claim of 
solicitor-client privilege to be made.19 Moreover, if a lawyer claims 
solicitor-client privilege, the lawyer is required to provide the client’s last 
known address to the FINTRAC representative so that the representative 
“may endeavour to advise the client of the claim of privilege that has 
been made on their behalf and may by doing so give the client an 
                                                                                                                       
11  See Regulation, id., at ss. 59.4(2) and 33.5. 
12  Act, supra, note 4, at s. 74. 
13  Id., at ss. 62-63.1. 
14  Id., at s. 62. 
15  Id., at s. 63. 
16  Id., at s. 64(2). 
17  Id., at s. 64(3). 
18  Id., at s. 64(4). 
19  Id., at s. 64(9). 
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opportunity, if it is practicable within the time limited by this section, to 
waive the privilege before the matter is to be decided by a judge”.20 
The search and seizure provisions also authorize FINTRAC to 
disclose any information found during a search to “the appropriate law 
enforcement agencies” for the purpose of aiding an investigation  
or prosecution of an offence under the Act.21 However, as a result of 
amendments made to the Act following the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal decision in this case and before the Supreme Court hearing, the 
Act only allows law enforcement to use the information received as 
evidence of a contravention of the client identification and record-
keeping obligations imposed by the Regime.22  
3.  Procedural History  
The procedural history of this case is arguably as complex as the 
Regime at issue. Although the Supreme Court decision was released in 
2015, lawyers were first subject to the Regime in 2001 when they  
were required to report “suspicious transactions” to FINTRAC.23 In 
response to this development, the Federation and several provincial law 
societies initiated multiple parallel court proceedings challenging the 
constitutional validity of the regime.24 In five provinces, the Federation 
and law societies were successful in obtaining interlocutory injunctions 
that exempted lawyers from the Regime until the merits of the 
constitutional challenges could be determined.25 In 2002, the Federation 
and the Attorney General of Canada reached an agreement allowing the 
matter to proceed through one binding test case in British Columbia.26 
                                                                                                                       
20  Id., at s. 64(10). 
21  Id., at s. 65(1). 
22  Id., at s. 65(3). 
23  Federation of Law Societies, supra, note 2, at para. 23. 
24  Id. 
25  Law Society of British Columbia v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] B.C.J. No. 2420, 
2001 BCSC 1593 (B.C.S.C.), affd [2002] B.C.J. No. 130 (B.C.C.A.); Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] A.J. No. 1697 (Alta. Q.B.); Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] O.J. No. 17, 57 O.R. (3d) 383 (Ont. 
S.C.J.); Federation of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] N.S.J.  
No. 199, 2002 NSSC 95 (N.S.S.C.); Federation of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2002] S.J. No. 200, 2002 SKQB 153 (Sask. Q.B.). 
26  Federation of Law Societies, supra, note 2, at para. 23. 
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The Attorney General also consented to interlocutory injunctions in 
jurisdictions in which injunctions had not yet been granted.27 
Before the matter first came before the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia in 2011, the Regime went through several changes. In 2003, 
for example, lawyers were formally exempted from the application of the 
Regime through the passage of a new regulation.28 However, in December 
2008, new regulations were put in place making lawyers subject to the 
Regime once again.29 By this time, the Regime included the client 
identification, record-keeping and search and seizure provisions at issue 
before the Supreme Court.30 However, the Regime has never actually 
been applied to lawyers, because the Federation and the Attorney 
General of Canada agreed to another consent order in 2010 exempting 
lawyers, retroactive to December 2008, pending a determination on the 
constitutionality of the current provisions.31 
Also before the matter came before the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, Canadian law societies developed their own regulations aimed 
at preventing lawyers from being used as intermediaries for money 
laundering or terrorist financing. All Canadian law societies now enforce 
client identification and verification rules based on model rules 
developed by the Federation in 2008.32  
Although the client identification and verification rules adopted by 
Canadian law societies cover much of the same territory as the federal 
government’s statutory regime, these professional conduct rules are,  
as observed by the Supreme Court of Canada, “narrower in scope” than 
the Regime.33 For example, the Regime does not exempt funds paid, 
received or transferred by electronic funds transfer from its client 
identification and record-keeping obligations, while professional conduct 
                                                                                                                       
27  Federation of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] B.C.J.  
No. 1779, 2011 BCSC 1270, at para. 19 (B.C.S.C.), affd [2013] B.C.J. No. 632 (B.C.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Federation of Law Societies BCSC”]. 
28  Federation of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] B.C.J. No. 632, 
2013 BCCA 147, 359 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 18 (B.C.C.A.), vard [2015] S.C.J. No. 7 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Federation of Law Societies BCCA”]. 
29  Id., at para. 21. 
30  Id. 
31  Federation of Law Societies BCSC, supra, note 27, at para. 41. 
32  Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Rules to Fight Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing, online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada <http://flsc.ca/national-
initiatives/model-rules-to-fight-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing/> and Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada, Federation fights money laundering with new “know-your-client” model rule, 
online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada <http://flsc.ca/federation-fights-money-laundering-
with-new-know-your-client-model-rule/>. 
33  Federation of Law Societies, supra, note 2, at para. 107. 
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rules do contain such an exemption. By way of another example, the 
professional conduct rules do not include an obligation to produce and 
retain a “receipt of funds”, like that contained in the Regime.34 
III. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
1.  Trial 
As agreed to by the Federation and the Attorney General, the 
constitutionality of the provisions was first considered in the context of a 
petition before the Supreme Court of British Columbia wherein the 
Federation alleged that the Regime breached both section 7 and section 8 
of the Charter.  
Following a six-day hearing, Gerow J., who also had the benefit of a 
written record spanning 15,000 pages and which included 50 affidavits and 
exhibits, ruled in favour of the Federation.35 With respect to section 7, 
Gerow J. concluded that the impugned client identification and record-
keeping provisions engaged the liberty interests of both lawyers and their 
clients.36 She further concluded that the Regime jeopardized these liberty 
interests in manner that interfered with solicitor-client privilege —  
a recognized principle of fundamental justice.37 In view of this holding 
on section 7, Gerow J. concluded it was unnecessary to consider whether 
the search and seizure provisions also violated section 8.38 
With respect to section 1, Gerow J. found that the section 7 
infringement was not justified. In large part, she based this conclusion on 
the fact that the provincial and territorial law societies had already 
adopted less intrusive regulations in this area.39 Regarding remedy, 
Gerow J. read down several of the impugned provisions to exclude 
lawyers and law firms and severed those provisions that dealt 
specifically with the legal profession, declaring them to be of no force 
and effect.40 
                                                                                                                       
34  See id., at para. 107 for more examples. 
35  Federation of Law Societies BCSC, supra, note 27, at para. 75. 
36  Id., at paras. 84-144. 
37  Id., at para. 144. 
38  Id., at paras. 145-146. 
39  Id., at para. 213. 
40  Id., at para. 215. 
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2.  Court of Appeal 
Writing for the majority at the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
Hinkson J.A., as he then was, largely agreed with Gerow J.’s decision below. 
One significant difference, however, was his conclusion that the relevant 
principle of fundamental justice engaged was the “independence of the Bar” 
as opposed to solicitor-client privilege.41 Although independence of the bar 
had not previously been recognized as a principle of fundamental justice, 
Hinkson J.A. found that it met the requirements for recognizing a new 
principle as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Malmo-Levine.42  
In his section 7 analysis, Hinkson J.A. found that the Regime engaged 
the liberty interests of clients and lawyers in a manner that did not accord 
with the independence of the bar insofar as the regime imposed “conflicting 
interests and corresponding obligations on the lawyer, regarding clients’ 
interests, state interests and lawyers’ liberty interests”.43 With respect to 
section 1, Hinkson J.A. did find that Gerow J. erred in concluding that there 
was no rational connection between the objective of the Regime and the 
means employed, but held that this error did not detract from her analysis 
on the second or third elements of the second part of the Oakes test.44  
Like the trial decision, the majority of the Court of Appeal found it 
unnecessary to address whether the Regime also violated section 8 of the 
Charter.45 
Concurring reasons, authored by Frankel J.A., agreed with the 
majority reasons except for Hinkson J.A.’s conclusion that the Regime 
engaged the section 7 liberty interests of individual clients. On this issue, 
Frankel J.A. concluded that “the connection between the requirements 
imposed on lawyers and the possibility of the client being charged is far 
too tenuous to engage the client’s liberty interests.”46 
3.  Supreme Court of Canada 
At the Supreme Court, Cromwell J., writing for the majority, held that 
the Regime violated both sections 7 and 8 of the Charter and could not be 
saved under section 1.  
                                                                                                                       
41  Federation of Law Societies BCCA, supra, note 28, at para. 118. 
42  Id., at paras. 105-114. 
43  Id., at paras. 116-125. 
44  Id., at paras. 126-159. 
45  Id., at para. 162. 
46  Id., at para. 168. 
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In contrast to the approach taken by the courts below, Cromwell J. first 
considered whether the Regime’s search and seizure provisions infringed 
section 8. On section 8, Cromwell J. rejected the Attorney General’s 
submission that the search and seizure provisions were reasonable because 
“they relate to a limited class of documents for a narrow, regulatory 
purpose and there are appropriate safeguards to protect solicitor-client 
privilege”47 and instead found that: 
… The regime authorizes sweeping law office searches which inherently 
risk breaching solicitor-client privilege. It does so in a criminal law 
setting and for criminal law purposes. In my view, the constitutional 
principles governing these searches are set out in the Court’s decision  
in Lavallee, and this scheme does not comply with them.48  
In its 2002 decision, Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney 
General), the Supreme Court of Canada had considered the constitutionality 
of a section of the Criminal Code which had set out a procedure for 
determining a claim of solicitor-client privilege in relation to documents 
seized from a law office under a warrant.49 The majority of the Court 
struck down the section, finding that the procedure which it set out 
“unconstitutionally jeopardize[d] solicitor-client privilege” pursuant to 
section 8 of the Charter.50 In the course of its reasons, the majority also 
articulated a number of general principles which were to govern the 
legality of law office searches “as a matter of common law until 
Parliament, if it sees fit, re-enacts legislation on the issue” and which 
“should also guide the legislative options that Parliament may want to 
address in that respect”.51 
Among other things, Cromwell J. highlighted two of the general 
principles set out in Lavallee as being particularly relevant to the case  
at bar: (1) that prior judicial authorization should be required before 
authorities can search a law office, unless there are no other reasonable 
alternatives to the search and (2) that, unless otherwise specified by a 
warrant, “all documents in possession of a lawyer must be sealed before 
being examined or removed from a lawyer’s possession”.52 With respect 
                                                                                                                       
47  Federation of Law Societies, supra, note 2, at para. 34. 
48  Id., at para. 35. 
49  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v. 
Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, [2002] S.C.J. No. 61, 2002 SCC 61 (S.C.C.), affg [2000] 
O.J. No. 4549 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Lavallee”]. 
50  Id., at para. 9. 
51  Id., at para. 49. 
52  Federation of Law Societies, supra, note 2, at paras. 54-55. 
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to the first principle, he observed that, except with respect to home 
offices, the search and seizure provisions “do not require prior judicial 
authorization, let alone impose a statutory requirement that there be no 
other reasonable alternative”.53 Regarding the second, he noted that the 
Regime provided that “examining and copying in a law office by the 
official only stops at the point at which a claim of solicitor-client 
privilege is asserted by a lawyer on behalf of a named client” and this 
approach “greatly elevates the risk that privileged material will be 
examined”.54 Justice Cromwell further noted that the requirements for 
the lawyer to disclose the client’s name and last known address as part  
of the process of asserting privilege risked, in and of themselves, obliging 
the lawyer to breach privilege.55 He held that this infringement of section 8 
was not saved under section 1 given that it was not minimally impairing: 
specifically, the search and seizure provisions could have included  
the protections for solicitor-client privilege outlined in Lavallee.56  
With respect to section 7, the majority held that the Regime’s 
provisions engaged the liberty interests of lawyers in a manner that was 
not in accordance with a lawyer’s duty of commitment to the client’s 
cause — a duty which the Court recognized, for the first time, to be a 
principle of fundamental justice.57  
Rather than adopt the Court of Appeal’s section 7 analysis rooted in 
recognizing the independence of the bar as a principle of fundamental 
justice, Cromwell J. grounded his analysis in what he characterized as a 
narrower principle included within the concept of lawyer independence: 
“that the state cannot impose duties on lawyers that interfere with their 
duty of commitment to advancing their clients’ legitimate interests”.58  
In applying the three-part Malmo-Levine test to this narrower 
principle, Cromwell J. held:  
(1) “The duty of commitment to the client’s cause has been recognized 
by the Court as a distinct element of the broader common law duty of 
loyalty and thus unquestionably is a legal principle.”59  
                                                                                                                       
53  Id., at para. 54. 
54  Id., at para. 55. 
55  Id. 
56  Id., at para. 61. 
57  Id., at para. 70. 
58  Id., at para. 77. 
59  Id., at para. 91. 
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(2)  There is sufficient consensus that the duty is fundamental, given, the 
importance of clients and the broader public feeling “confident that 
lawyers are committed to serving their client’s legitimate interest free 
of other obligations that might interfere with that duty”60 and the 
recognition in various international instruments of “the fundamental 
importance of preventing state interference with legal representation”.61  
(3)  “While this standard is far from self-applying, it has proven to be 
sufficiently precise to enable the courts to apply it in widely 
divergent fact situations [relating to lawyerly conflicts of interest].”62 
In terms of what the duty of commitment to a client’s cause requires 
“[i]n the context of state action engaging s. 7 of the Charter”, 
Cromwell J. found that “this means at least that (subject to justification) 
the state cannot impose duties on lawyers that undermine the lawyer’s 
compliance with that duty, either in fact or in the perception of a 
reasonable person, fully apprised of all the relevant circumstances and 
having thought the matter through.”63 
As support for finding the Regime to be inconsistent with a lawyer’s 
duty of commitment, the majority pointed to the fact that the Regime (1) 
required lawyers to collect and retain “considerably more” information 
as compared to what law societies themselves deemed necessary in order 
to guard against money laundering and terrorist financing and (2) did not 
contain adequate protection for solicitor-client privilege, for the reasons 
outlined in the section 8 analysis.64 In view of these two realities, Justice 
Cromwell concluded: 
… a reasonable and informed person, thinking the matter through, 
would perceive that these provisions in combination significantly 
undermine the capacity of lawyers to provide committed representation. 
The reasonable and well-informed client would see his or her lawyer 
being required by the state to collect and retain information that, in the 
view of the legal profession, is not required for effective and ethical 
representation and with respect to which there are inadequate protections 
for solicitor-client privilege.65 
                                                                                                                       
60  Id., at para. 96. 
61  Id., at para. 101. 
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63  Id., at para. 103. 
64  Id., at paras. 104-114. 
65  Id., at para. 109. 
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With respect to section 1, the majority decision agreed with the 
conclusion reached by the courts below that the Regime failed the 
proportionality test and was thus not a justifiable limit on lawyers’ 
section 7 rights.66 
In brief concurring reasons, McLachlin C.J.C. and Moldaver J. agreed 
with the majority’s analysis with respect to section 8 but disagreed that 
the lawyer’s duty of commitment to the client’s cause was sufficiently 
certain so as to constitute a principle of fundamental justice, observing 
that “[t]he lawyer’s commitment to the client’s interests will vary with 
the nature of the retainer between the lawyer and the client, as well as 
with other circumstances.”67  
Instead of rooting the section 7 analysis in a duty of a commitment to a 
client’s cause, the Chief Justice and Moldaver J. took the position that the 
issue “would be better resolved relying on the principle of fundamental 
justice which recognizes that the lawyer is required to keep the client’s 
confidences — solicitor-client privilege” — noting that this has “already 
been recognized as a constitutional norm” and that the majority’s decision 
had relied on potential breaches of solicitor-client privilege in grounding 
its section 7 analysis in a duty of commitment to a client’s cause.68 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In identifying and applying a new principle of fundamental justice — 
“commitment to a client’s cause” — the majority approached its section 7 
analysis in a manner that departed from the courts below. The reasons 
suggest that the majority’s intention in doing so was to sidestep some of 
the apparent problems in adopting a broad notion of independence of the 
bar as the applicable principle of fundamental justice. 
More specifically, Cromwell J. wrote that there was “considerable 
merit” in the Attorney General’s submissions which contended, inter 
alia, that “the Court of Appeal’s broad definition of the independence of 
the bar essentially places lawyers above the law … [and that] [t]he 
principle of the independence of the bar does not meet any of the three 
requirements that must be met by a principle of fundamental justice.”69 
Justice Cromwell further suggested that the ultimate merits of these 
                                                                                                                       
66  Id., at para. 114. 
67  Id., at para. 119. 
68  Id., at para. 120. 
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submissions need not be determined as “[t]he narrower understanding of 
the independence of the bar which relates it to the lawyer’s duty of 
commitment to the client’s cause is the aspect of the lawyer’s special 
duty to his or her client that is most relevant to this appeal.”70 
Unfortunately, the majority’s attempt to simplify the analysis through 
using a lawyer’s duty of commitment to a client’s cause instead of 
independence of the bar as the applicable principle of fundamental 
justice leads to more confusion than clarity. 
1.  The Trouble with Commitment 
The majority’s inspiration for recognizing a lawyer’s duty of 
commitment as a new principle of fundamental justice did not come from 
the submissions before it but rather from two of the Court’s previous 
private law decisions addressing a lawyer’s fiduciary duty to avoid 
conflicting interests in relation to acting against current or former 
clients.71 As is apparent from a reading of these decisions, the concept of 
a duty of commitment to a client’s cause is simply a restatement of the 
more familiar concept of a duty of zealous advocacy. In these prior cases, 
what the Court is concerned about is the danger that a lawyer will “soft 
peddle” his or her representation of one client because of concern for 
another client.72  
In this case, the majority decision extends this notion of avoiding 
“soft peddling” from conflicts arising between clients to conflicts arising 
from compliance with government regulation. Although, at first glance, 
this may seem like a sensible extension of the principle, it quickly proves 
to be problematic. The source of the problem is the majority’s failure to 
seriously grapple with, or even acknowledge, the reality that the duty of 
commitment to a client’s cause or, stated in its more familiar form, the 
duty of zealous advocacy, is not an unqualified principle but, rather, is 
subject to its own internal limitations. 
                                                                                                                       
70  Id., at para. 80. 
71  Canadian National Railway Co. v. McKercher LLP, [2013] S.C.J. No. 39, [2013] 2 
S.C.R. 649, 2013 SCC 39 (S.C.C.), revg [2011] S.J. No. 589 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “McKercher”] 
and R. v. Neil, [2002] S.C.J. No. 72, 2002 SCC 70 (S.C.C.), affg [2000] A.J. No. 1164 (Alta. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Neil”]. 
72  In McKercher, the Court further clarified that this aspect of the duty of commitment 
precludes lawyers from “summarily and unexpectedly” firing one client in order to represent another 
client that, but for the firing, the lawyer would not be able to represent due to a conflict of interest. 
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The question of how committed a lawyer should be to a client’s cause 
to the exclusion of other interests and demands — like, for example, 
broader notions of justice — is the subject of significant debate in legal 
ethics scholarship.73 That said, even the most ardent defenders of lawyer 
partisanship do not contend that this obligation is unconstrained and 
never yields to other interests or demands.74 They further agree that one 
minimum constraint on a lawyer acting for a client is that the lawyer must 
act within the limits of the law.75 Indeed, as a matter of positive law, this 
constraint has been explicitly embedded into the professional conduct 
rules that govern lawyers in both Canada and the United States.76  
Once it is acknowledged that a lawyer’s duty of commitment is 
internally limited by what the law demands otherwise, it starts to become 
tricky, if not impossible, to use this duty as a meaningful principle of 
fundamental justice in a section 7 analysis. More specifically, the fact 
that a lawyer’s commitment to a client’s cause is recognized to be 
bounded by legality leads to a logically troubled structure of analysis 
insofar as it involves attempting to provide a constitutional limit to how 
the law can regulate lawyers by using a standard that itself refers to the 
                                                                                                                       
73  For example, William Simon has prominently argued that lawyers should not primarily 
orient themselves to being zealous advocates but rather should “take such actions as, considering the 
relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice” (William H. Simon, 
The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 
at 9). For more recent discussion about the appropriate bounds of the lawyer’s role in the Canadian 
context, see, for example, Alice Woolley, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics in Canada (Toronto: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2011); Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism” (2008) 46 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 51; and David Tanovich, “Law’s Ambition and the Reconstruction of Role Morality in 
Canada” (2005) 28 Dal. L.J. 267. 
74  See, for example, Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010); Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues? A Defence of the Standard Concept of 
the Lawyer’s Role (New York: Ashgate Publishing, 2009); and Alice Woolley, Understanding 
Lawyers’ Ethics in Canada, id. 
75  See id. Although there is debate in legal ethics scholarship about how to understand what 
exactly it means to follow the law while being a zealous advocate (for example, does the lawyer just 
have to follow the black-letter of the law or does he or she have to take the “spirit” of the law into 
account), the idea that lawyers are required to follow the law when representing clients is widely 
accepted. 
76  Specifically, Rule 5.1-1 of the Federation of Law Societies of Canada’s Model Code of 
Professional Conduct states: 
5.1-1 When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must represent the client resolutely and 
honourably within the limits of the law, while treating the tribunal with candour, fairness, 
courtesy and respect. 
Similarly, the Preamble to the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
references “the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, 
within the bounds of the law”. 
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law as a limit on its scope. Stated otherwise, the argument starts to look 
like this: 
(1) X (i.e., a law regulating lawyers) is unconstitutional if, 
(2) X engages lawyer’s life, liberty or security interest;  
(3) X requires Y, which interferes with the lawyer’s partisan representation 
of a client; and 
(4) Y is not required by law (i.e., is not required by X or any other law). 
The reason that (4) is stated as such is because if Y is required by law, 
it is, by definition, not an interference with a lawyer’s duty to zealously 
represent a client within the limits of the law. As noted in the introduction 
to this article, there is no foothold in the concept of zealous advocacy itself 
from which to adjudge other laws, as the concept itself takes such laws to 
trump its requirements and permissions, merely due to their existence.  
2.  A Few Failed Attempts at Refinement 
In its application of a duty of committed representation to the Regime, the 
majority decision attempts to add some refinement to (4) above, by focusing 
on two aspects of the Regime: (1) the fact that it is more extensive than the 
regulations that the law societies put in place in terms of what information 
must be obtained and recorded; and (2) the fact that solicitor-client privileged 
information is not adequately protected. Justice Cromwell writes: 
… [T]he legislation requires lawyers to gather and retain considerably 
more information than the profession thinks is needed for ethical and 
effective client representation. This, coupled with the inadequate 
protection of solicitor-client privilege, undermines the lawyer’s ability 
to comply with his or her duty of commitment to the client’s cause. The 
lawyer is required to create and preserve records which are not required 
for ethical and effective representation. The lawyer is required to do 
this in the knowledge that any solicitor-client confidences contained in 
these records are not adequately protected against searches and seizures 
authorized by the scheme. This may, in the lawyer’s correctly formed 
opinion, be contrary to the client’s legitimate interests and therefore 
these duties imposed by the scheme may directly conflict with the 
lawyer’s duty of committed representation.77 
                                                                                                                       
77  Federation of Law Societies, supra, note 2, at para. 108. 
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With this finesse, the structure of the argument appears to have 
translated into: 
(1) X (i.e., a law regulating lawyers) is unconstitutional if, 
(2) X engages lawyer’s life, liberty or security interest;  
(3) X requires Y, which interferes with the lawyer’s partisan representation 
of a client; and 
(4) Y is (a) not required by law society rules and (b) fails to adequately 
protect solicitor-client privileged information. 
With respect to the first branch of refinement in this argument (i.e., the 
majority’s reliance on the fact that the Regime is more extensive than law 
society rules), Cromwell J. is careful to point out that “[p]rofessional 
ethical standards such as these cannot dictate to Parliament what the public 
interest requires or set the constitutional parameters for legislation. … 
[b]ut [rather] provide evidence of a strong consensus in the profession  
as to what ethical practice in relation to these issues requires.”78 
Notwithstanding this caveat, however, the majority decision uses the mere 
existence of less constraining professional conduct rules, “coupled” with 
the failure to adequately protect solicitor-client privilege, to constitute a 
reason to find the Regime unconstitutional.  
There is no explanation as to why the law society rules are taken to be 
superior other than the fact that the profession itself “thinks” that the 
right balance is struck. This reasoning is far from satisfying. As Woolley 
writes in her analysis of the decision: “the position ‘if it is different than 
what the profession thinks then it is prima facie excessive’ seems to grant 
status to self-regulation of the legal profession that the Court purported 
to reject [elsewhere in the decision].”79 This degree of deference to the 
legal profession’s self-imposed standards is also starkly out-of-step with 
other recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. Indeed, the very 
line of case law from which the concept of a “duty of a commitment to a 
client’s cause” is taken involves the Court finding that more rigorous 
rules for managing conflicts of interest were required than those provided 
                                                                                                                       
78  Id. 
79  Alice Woolley, “Lawyers’ Representation, Lawyers’ Regulation and Section 7 of the 
Charter” ABlawg.ca (February 23, 2015) online: <http://ablawg.ca/2015/02/23/lawyers-representation- 
lawyers-regulation-and-section-7-of-the-charter/>; see also, Alice Woolley, “Fundamental Justice 
(Sort of Maybe) Requires a Lawyer’s Commitment to a Client’s Cause” (2015) 34:2 N.J.C.L. 209. 
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in law society rules in order to ensure that lawyers fulfilled their 
fiduciary obligations.80 
The second branch of refinement here (i.e., the reference to 
inadequate protections for privileged information) would seem to provide 
a stronger basis for finding that the Regime unduly interferes with the 
lawyer’s duty to be committed to the client’s cause. As discussed 
elsewhere in the decision, there is strong jurisprudential authority for the 
proposition that solicitor-client privilege should be fiercely protected. In 
his discussion of the Lavallee decision, Cromwell J. observes: 
The core principle of the decision is that solicitor-client privilege “must 
remain as close to absolute as possible if it is to retain relevance”… . 
This means that there must be a “stringent” norm to ensure its 
protection, such that any legislative provisions that interfere with the 
privilege more than “absolutely necessary” will be found to be 
unreasonable … .81 
However, if solicitor-client privilege is to do all the work in the 
section 7 analysis, this would seem to naturally lead to the position taken 
in the minority reasons that the section 7 analysis “would be better 
resolved relying on the principle of fundamental justice which recognizes 
that the lawyer is required to keep the client’s confidences — solicitor-
client privilege”.82  
It is not clear, though, that protecting solicitor-client privilege 
represents everything at stake in this case. It is not self-evident, for 
example, that if the search and seizure provisions of Regime were 
changed to be compliant with Lavallee this would render the Regime 
constitutionally compliant. This is a particularly relevant hypothetical 
given that the Attorney General specifically requested in this case that, if 
the Court found that the requirements set out in Lavallee were applicable 
to the Regime, the Court simply read in any Lavallee requirements that 
were absent in the search and seizure provisions.83 The majority rejected 
this remedial request, noting, inter alia, that reading in was not an 
appropriate constitutional remedy given that there were a variety of 
legislative approaches to rendering the search and seizure provisions 
                                                                                                                       
80  For further discussion, see Adam M. Dodek, “Conflicted Identities: The Battle over the 
Duty of Loyalty in Canada” (2011) 14:2 Legal Ethics 193; Simon Chester, The Conflicts Revolution: 
Martin v. Gray and Fifteen Years of Change (Toronto: Heenan Blaikie LLP, 2006); and Amy 
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83  Id., at para. 64; see also, Factum of the Attorney General of Canada, at paras. 110-118. 
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constitutional.84 It would appear, however, to be a live possibility that the 
government itself may propose such amendments in the future. In a 2015 
document published after the Court’s decision in this case, the Department 
of Finance indicated that it was “revisiting” the provisions at issue and 
“intends to bring forward new provisions for the legal profession that 
would be constitutionally compliant”.85 
Even assuming that all solicitor-client privileged information could be 
appropriately protected, there remains something unsettling about a 
statutory regime that requires a lawyer, at the government’s request, to 
record details about a client’s identity and funds for reasons relating to a 
government policy objective and unrelated to the delivery of legal 
services to a client. A comparative fictional example might be a statutory 
regime that would require lawyers to read a government prescribed 
warning to all clients at the beginning of a retainer that reminded clients 
of the importance of paying all their taxes or, to take a government 
objective even further away from the legal realm, a government reminder 
to clients of the importance of maintaining their heart health. The fact 
that these fictional warning regimes would not result in disclosure of 
privileged information and do not appear to objectively interfere with 
how vigorously a lawyer would represent a client do not seem to render 
them unproblematic.  
But, smell-test aside, what might be the problem with this type of 
government activity? The answer may lie in the need for clients to have 
confidence that the lawyers representing them are providing them with 
undivided loyalty. Stated otherwise, clients might not trust lawyers who 
are working simultaneously for them and the government in the context 
of the same retainer, even if the work for government does not touch on 
the legal services being delivered to the clients. As Binnie J. stated in  
R. v. Neil, one of the conflicts decisions cited by the majority in this case: 
[The duty of loyalty] endures because it is essential to the integrity of 
the administration of justice and it is of high public importance that 
public confidence in that integrity be maintained … . Unless a litigant 
is assured of the undivided loyalty of the lawyer, neither the public nor 
the litigant will have confidence that the legal system, which may 
appear to them to be a hostile and hideously complicated environment, 
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is a reliable and trustworthy means of resolving their disputes and 
controversies.86 
This is perhaps what the majority was attempting to capture in this 
case by discussing the importance of client perceptions of government 
regulation of the legal profession. As noted above, in explaining the 
scope of the duty of commitment to a client’s cause, the majority 
decision states: 
… In the context of state action engaging s. 7 of the Charter, this 
means at least that (subject to justification) the state cannot impose 
duties on lawyers that undermine the lawyer’s compliance with that 
duty, either in fact or in the perception of a reasonable person, fully 
apprised of all of the relevant circumstances and having thought the 
matter through.87 
This additional layer now seems to change the structure of the 
argument into: 
(1) X (i.e. a law regulating lawyers) is unconstitutional if, 
(2) X engages lawyer’s life, liberty or security interest; and 
(3) X requires Y, which the reasonable person would perceive as 
undermining the lawyer’s commitment to a client’s cause (regardless 
of whether it in fact does). 
Although client trust may be at the heart of the issue here, the Court’s 
use of client perceptions as an evaluative measure is curious, especially 
given the fact that the Court’s evaluation of other regulatory efforts 
involving the legal profession focuses on objective risks of impaired 
representation. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
jurisprudence in relation to law office searches is concerned with the 
potential of privileged information, in fact, being disclosed.88 Similarly, 
the Court’s jurisprudence relating to conflicts of interests is considered 
with “real risks” of prejudice — for example, in Canadian National 
Railway Co. v. McKercher LLP, a unanimous Court held that when a law 
firm is asked to act against an existing client on an unrelated matter that 
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falls outside of the “bright line rule”, the operative question is whether  
“a substantial risk of impaired representation” will be created if the law 
firm takes on the new retainer.89  
3.  A Way Forward 
If self-regulatory standards, solicitor-client privilege or client 
perceptions are all poor ways of thinking through what is at stake in a 
case like this, what is the alternative? The most coherent argument, I 
believe, can be found by looking back to independence of the bar and 
attempting to infuse that concept with more meaning rather than turning 
the concept of commitment to a client’s cause. In this regard, Alice 
Woolley has offered some particularly cogent suggestions in her analysis 
of independence of the bar as a constitutional principle.90 As a matter of 
constitutional law she argues, inter alia: 
[A] court reviewing state action that inhibits a person’s ability to access 
the advice, advocacy or argument of a lawyer ought to be concerned 
about the constitutional legitimacy of that action. Where the inhibition 
is material and does not itself further rule of law values (e.g., by 
ensuring a lawyer’s advice stays within the bounds of legality), the 
inhibition should be viewed as prima facie unconstitutional. The 
inhibition may be justifiable if it protects important substantive legal 
norms, but those would be exceptional cases, akin to the privilege 
exception for the prevention of an imminent risk of serious injury to an 
identifiable group.91 
Woolley’s discussion of “rule of law values” is sophisticated, drawing 
on the work of Jeremy Waldron. However, in brief, one way to 
understand what she means when referring to lawyer regulation that 
furthers rule of law values is to understand it as “regulation that 
facilitates lawyers’ accomplishment of their various functions within the 
legal system would enhance the functioning of law”.92 Regulation that 
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190 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
would fit in this category would include, for example, the duty that a 
litigator has to disclose adverse authority or the duty to be civil even in 
cases where rudeness might more effectively advance a client’s cause.93  
Framing this in terms of client trust, it is possible to see how lawyer 
regulation that aims to facilitate lawyers fulfilling their role in the legal 
system (by not, for example, concealing relevant precedent or bullying 
other lawyers or opposing parties), would not reasonably detract from a 
client’s perception of his or her lawyer as a trusted and loyal advisor 
helping him or her navigate the legal system.  
Although Woolley argues that independence of the bar, understood as 
set out in the quotation from her above, “ought to be recognized … as an 
aspect of [section 7]”, she does not focus in her article on the details of 
how this recognition should be manifest. Here, I would like to suggest 
that: (1) the independence of the bar ought to be recognized as a 
principle of fundamental justice; (2) the rule of law values that Woolley 
discusses be built into our understanding of the independence of the bar 
as a principle of fundamental justice; and (3) the question of the extent to 
which “other substantive legal norms” operate to justify state intrusions 
on the lawyer-client relationship in “exceptional cases” be considered 
under section 1. To go back to our argument diagramming, we would 
then be left with the following as a section 7 analysis: 
(1) X (i.e., a law regulating lawyers) is unconstitutional if, 
(2) X engages lawyer’s life, liberty or security interest;  
(3) X requires Y, which intrudes on the lawyer-client relationship; and 
(4)  Y is not related to rule of law values (i.e., facilitating the lawyer’s 
role in the legal system). 
There would still be room to consider under section 1 whether the 
state regulation furthers other important government policy objectives 
such that the intrusion should be exceptionally justified. Two advantages 
to considering such other intrusions under section 1 are that: (1) the 
jurisprudence already incorporates the concept of exceptionality when 
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93  For discussion of these duties, see, for example, Stephen G.A. Pitel &Yu Seon Gadsden-
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considering section 7 violations under section 1; and (2) proportionality 
would be explicitly incorporated into the analysis.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada resolved a multi-year dispute 
between the federal government and Canadian law societies about how 
lawyers should be regulated in order to combat money-laundering and 
terrorist financing. The outcome should provide lawyers with some relief 
that the courts will not lightly allow the state to interfere in their 
relationships with their clients. However, as elaborated above, there are 
reasons to be concerned with whether the majority’s decision provided a 
solid jurisprudential basis for the result reached.  
It remains to be seen what broader consequences the holding in this 
case will have for the future judicial regulation of lawyers. It is possible 
that we will not have to wait too long to find out if the new Liberal 
government follows through on its predecessor’s promise last year to 
introduce amendments that would, in its view, allow the Regime to apply 
to lawyers in a constitutionally compliant manner.94 Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Round 2, may be just 
around the corner. 
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